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Why do governments privatize? Why do some countries accomplish large-scale privatization programmes, and others never privatize at all? This work provides some answers to these questions trying to test research hypotheses set forth by the economic theory of privatization

International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries.

This paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977-99 period. The empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries, endowed with deep and liquid stock markets, and is affected by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints. But the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries, where shareholders are poorly protected, banks powerful, and capital markets less developed.

This paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977-99 period. The empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries, endowed with deep and liquid stock markets, and is affected by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints. But the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries, where shareholders are poorly protected, banks powerful, and capital markets less developed.

Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of state-owned enterprises, is a worldwide phenomenon. Which political, economic and institutional factors are shaping this process? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence from a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis of the period 1977-96, the decision to privatise and the choice of privatisation method appear to be influenced by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints, while the success of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold requires suitable institutions and developed capital markets.

This paper sheds some light about privatisation in utilities. An empirical analysis based on sales in the electricity sector in 38 countries for the period 1977-97 shows that regulation is a crucial institutional variable in privatisation. Not only does it allow governments to increase the pace of divestiture and to sell higher stakes, but it also maximises proceeds reducing regulatory risk. The revenues-efficiency trade-off loses some relevance in electricity privatisation.

This paper investigates the companies' behavioural response to information-based environmental policies. We perform a panel analysis for 39 big companies in 16 countries, in 3 polluting industries (oil & gas, chemicals, power generation) over a 5- year period (1993-1997) to check whether environmental policies (command and control and energy taxation) and the adoption of information-based environmental strategies affect the companies' economic and environmental performance. The results confirm the positive role of self-regulated environmental audits and compensation programmes on corporate environmental performance.

What legal, political and economic institutions are shaping privatisations processes in the world? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence for a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis for the period 1977-1996, the decision to privatise appears to be related to political preferences and macroeconomic conditions, but the success of a privatisation process requires, in addition, appropriate legal institutions and developed capital markets.